1 result for (book:tes5 AND session:218 AND stemmed:time)
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[...] Therefore, while this time one of continuous moments is no longer experienced after death, it is still a reality within basic time itself, a reality toward which the personality simply is no longer focused. Because the individual is focused within time one now, you still realize, or should, that the time one is only a small portion of time, and that other kinds of time exist of which you are not aware.
It is one thing to conceive of basic time as being outside of physical time, for the sake of making a point; but it must be realized that Priestley’s time one, while only real to the ego, is nevertheless a part or a materialization that exists within this basic time framework, and the life force is at the same time within as well as without.
The number one time cannot contain other times but the consciousness, with help, can to some extent perceive these other times. And this perception then allows consciousness to escape some of the confinements of that one time. Our spacious present of which I have spoken contains all times, but it is not a thing apart from them, nor precisely their sum. [...]
[...] According to him the consciousness, the individual consciousness of time one, becomes something else at physical death, and the consciousness that is part of time two in physical life becomes dominant in the next existence. [...] Priestley’s individual, after death, with his dominant time two consciousness, has available to him what was time one during physical life.
But when you leave time one behind, or because you leave time one behind at death, this is no reason to imagine that time one exists separate and apart from basic time. [...]
Priestley does not go far enough with his time one, time two and time three, but he is fairly correct up to that point. [...]
[...] But this individual as seen by Priestley at this particular point is somewhat limited, still, by this time one. Time one is available to him, though not necessarily as a series of moments, one after another. [...] According to Priestley, while the individual therefore is free from successive moments, he still does not have easily available, at fingertips so to speak, any information or realizations from time three. [...]
Time three, after the individual’s physical death, becomes for him what time two is for him during this existence. It is therefore available only to the same degree that time two is available to him now.
One concerns myself and where I would stand in this time framework, and you should find this highly interesting. The other has to do with Dunne, for in one instance he saw further than Priestley, for he carried these times further. [...] For at some point the separate selves of Dunne’s, with their separate times, become aware of each other, and merge into the sort of superconsciousness that we have always called the entity.
The difficulty lies in making this communication, which is direct from me, to what would be Ruburt’s time three self, clear to the time one self of Ruburt’s, which must speak these words, in what could be called Priestley’s time one.