1 result for (book:tes5 AND session:218 AND stemmed:concept)
[... 9 paragraphs ...]
I am glad that you did not encounter these ideas earlier, since we cannot therefore be justly accused of having borrowed any of them. Ruburt is amazed at some of the similarities that exist in the concept of time as I am giving it to you, and the concepts held by Dunne and Priestley.
[... 10 paragraphs ...]
Priestley’s concept here becomes more limiting than he realized. At this point Dunne overtakes him precisely where he and Dunne disagree. For once having hypothesized times one, two and three, Dunne continues onward as is the case, and Priestley simply stops here in this particular respect.
[... 1 paragraph ...]
In concept, again on this particular point, Dunne went further. But in doing so he ended up in a frenzy, losing sight of where he was. And no wonder. It is simply because I am outside of these times that I can see through them more clearly, and there is no particular reason why I should be considered wiser in this respect than they. I am simply in a better position to observe. If Dunne were able to write another book now, on his time theories, he would be able to correct several of his well-intentioned errors.
[... 11 paragraphs ...]
It is a mistake to assume that any future or inevitable merging with a life force is ahead of you, in those terms. This is an error that is precisely due to that which Priestley himself abhors: distortions in thought caused by reliance upon the concept of time as a series of moments.
[... 43 paragraphs ...]
Having read Priestley’s ideas about Dunne, Ruburt now wonders if I am not a future self of his own, according to Dunne’s ideas; that is, if I am not one of those future selves of which Dunne speaks, or if I am not consciousness number two, or three even, of Priestley’s concept.
[... 4 paragraphs ...]
Now. While Dunne and Priestley and myself used different terms often to express the same concept, we also differ in many respects as far as these theories are concerned. My third undifferentiated layer, you see, would correspond to the consciousness of Priestley’s third time, which is why I can tell you that at that point individuality is indeed maintained, and personality continues.
[... 342 paragraphs ...]