“Seth material” search engine (Jane Roberts)

(Today Jane read all day, finishing up J. B. Priestley’s book, Man and Time, which she liked very much. She had read nothing by Priestley before, nor by Dunne, mentioned extensively in the Priestley book. After supper this evening Jane told me she thought Seth had come through twice, briefly, as she went about her daily chores before the session. Both instances concerned the Priestley book, which had excited her.

Now. Our friend Ruburt has finally discovered the works of Dunne, I see, and he has also been reading Priestley on the subject of time.

Ruburt has not been reading Dunne, incidentally, but Priestley’s interpretation of Dunne, which is something else again, but fairly accurate.

I am glad that you did not encounter these ideas earlier, since we cannot therefore be justly accused of having borrowed any of them. Ruburt is amazed at some of the similarities that exist in the concept of time as I am giving it to you, and the concepts held by Dunne and Priestley.

(Jane was both amazed and delighted. She came across the Priestley book while browsing in the library recently. We have heard of Dunne, of course, but have yet to read any of his works; for some reason the library here has none of his books.

Now. Priestley is indeed the priestly fellow, and Dunne is far from done, If you will forgive my jest. Portions of both of their theories are correct. Sometimes one of them is accurate on one point, and the other one completely off, and sometimes they are both wrong.

Priestley’s concept here becomes more limiting than he realized. At this point Dunne overtakes him precisely where he and Dunne disagree. For once having hypothesized times one, two and three, Dunne continues onward as is the case, and Priestley simply stops here in this particular respect.

I suggest a brief break, and we shall continue along these lines, for we are able to go ahead where Priestley and Dunne were not. We are able to do this, or I am able to do this, precisely because I am from beyond Priestley’s time one, two and three, and therefore free of the distortions which even he is unable to avoid.

In concept, again on this particular point, Dunne went further. But in doing so he ended up in a frenzy, losing sight of where he was. And no wonder. It is simply because I am outside of these times that I can see through them more clearly, and there is no particular reason why I should be considered wiser in this respect than they. I am simply in a better position to observe. If Dunne were able to write another book now, on his time theories, he would be able to correct several of his well-intentioned errors.

One concerns myself and where I would stand in this time framework, and you should find this highly interesting. The other has to do with Dunne, for in one instance he saw further than Priestley, for he carried these times further. But he also fell into an understandable error. For at some point the separate selves of Dunne’s, with their separate times, become aware of each other, and merge into the sort of superconsciousness that we have always called the entity.

These times do not go on indefinitely in the precise manner that Dunne thought. Neither do they stop as Priestley believes, at time three. There is a merging of selves into what you may call a superconsciousness, a synthesis; and from then on, dear friends, there is a beginning toward something new, and a something of which I am not prepared to speak this evening, but of which I shall speak in the near future.

Having read Priestley’s ideas about Dunne, Ruburt now wonders if I am not a future self of his own, according to Dunne’s ideas; that is, if I am not one of those future selves of which Dunne speaks, or if I am not consciousness number two, or three even, of Priestley’s concept.

Now. While Dunne and Priestley and myself used different terms often to express the same concept, we also differ in many respects as far as these theories are concerned. My third undifferentiated layer, you see, would correspond to the consciousness of Priestley’s third time, which is why I can tell you that at that point individuality is indeed maintained, and personality continues.

Priestley’s theories, although he would not use them in this way, could be used to give some insight along these directions. But because Priestley stopped with time three, you would have to pick up Dunne’s, until Dunne himself finally goes wrong.

Now I would be number six self, so to speak, according to Dunne. According to Priestley however, at this point in his theory, I would simply be that life force, or part of it, with no individuality. Priestley is more correct in depth however, though Dunne goes further, only to peter out. Nevertheless I would be a number six self. Using the same terms, however, I will make some distinctions. For as a number six self I have complete knowledge of all the other selves.

Now I could indeed be Ruburt’s number six self, you see. I am not, but I could be. It is entirely possible however, using Ruburt as an example, for Ruburt’s number six self, to communicate with Ruburt’s number one self; these communications sifting through the intervening selves however, and unfortunately. Now these various times of Priestley’s and Dunne’s have much in common with the planes of which I am speaking in our discussions, and the value fulfillment of our material is akin to Priestley’s insistence on depth within any given moment.

At this point I am at the level, again, that could be compared to Dunne’s number six self, as myself. I communicate through the third undifferentiated layer, that could be compared to Priestley’s consciousness at number three time.

I repeat myself because I want to make the points plain, and this material is difficult. But things simply do not happen as Dunne supposed they did. He was correct in carrying his times further than Priestley, but he was incorrect in assuming the serialization continued indefinitely along the same lines.

I do not believe that Dunne understood this. There is no serialization as he imagined, after a certain point, simply because this progression of selves through various times in a serial fashion is no longer necessary. The selves reach a point which is not a theoretical point, but a particular mathematically existent point, whereby these times and selves simply become one, or in our terms, an entity.

I must stress that individuality is never lost. But this is too complicated a subject to cover this evening. We have explained it rather adequately in terms of action however, and gestalts of selves do not imply a giving-up of individuality at all. It should be remembered here that reincarnation is simply a fact, and one which is not accepted by Priestley or Dunne.

Reincarnation, considered in this light however, is much more logical indeed than a reoccurring time. And incidentally it is also much more logically a part of these theories, although both Priestley and Dunne would be unable I believe to admit this.

Now. At some point you, Joseph, and Ruburt and myself, are part of the same entity. This entity is that synthesization that Dunne did not foresee, but it in no way implies a loss of individual identities. This is extremely difficult to explain, since when I use the word individual identity, I am not referring primarily to egotistical identity alone. As a matter of fact, I am in one way, and in one way only, a future self—this is extremely simplified—of Ruburt’s; that could be compared I suppose to a theoretical number twelve self, according to Dunne.

But we three are all part of another entity, or rather of an entity that exists at that point where Dunne’s serialization breaks down and a new synthesis takes place.